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ABSTRACT
Deep learning algorithms have increasingly been shown to lack robustness to sim-
ple adversarial examples (AdvX). An equally troubling observation is that these
adversarial examples transfer between different architectures trained on different
datasets. We investigate the transferability of adversarial examples between models
using the angle between the input-output Jacobians of different models. To demon-
strate the relevance of this approach, we perform case studies that involve jointly
training pairs of models. These case studies empirically justify the theoretical
intuitions for why the angle between gradients is a fundamental quantity in AdvX
transferability. Furthermore, we consider the asymmetry of AdvX transferability
between two models of the same architecture and explain it in terms of differences
in gradient norms between the models. Lastly, we provide a simple modification to
existing training setups that reduces transferability of adversarial examples between
pairs of models.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) consistently define state-of-the-art performance in many machine
learning areas such as image classification, segmentation, speech recognition and language translation
(Hinton et al., 2012; Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Sutskever et al., 2014). These results have lead to
DNNs being increasingly deployed in production settings, including self-driving cars, on-the-fly
speech translation, and facial recognition for identification. However, like previous machine learning
approaches, DNNs have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks during test time Szegedy
et al. (2013). The existence of such AdvX is of immense concern to the security community as
human decision making is outsourced to machine learning. Moreover, the arms race of AdvX has
been mainly one-sided with attackers being able to fool a diverse variety of proposed defenses.
While numerous approaches have been designed to reduce the threat of AdvX, iterative methods
optimizing the AdvX input by computing gradients have to date been successful in breaking proposed
defences (Carlini and Wagner, 2016). An unexpected result regarding adversarial examples is their
high level of transferability between deep learning models with different architectures and objective
functions. In fact, adversarial examples generated for a Deep Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
can even transfer to random forests, SVMs, and logistic regression models (Papernot et al., 2016).
This allows attackers to use surrogate models in a black box scenario, estimating gradients to break
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black box defences. Understanding why these unexpectedly high transferability rates arise could
inform future work on both black box and ensemble defences.
In our work, we focus on the transferability between deep learning models and gradient-based attacks.
Specifically, we consider the magnitudes and cosine similarity between input-output Jacobians of
model pairs, and show that they are a reliable predictor of transferability. By minimizing the cosine
similarity, we are able to significantly reduce the transferability of adversarial examples for any two
models we choose. We also explain why the transferability of adversarial examples between two
models is asymmetric, and show that it can be made to be symmetric using simple regularization.
The contributions of this paper are:
• Showing that small input-output Jacobian magnitudes create a false sense of security, and
should be reported along with attack parameters
• Understanding the asymmetry of adversarial example transferability that still exists when
controlling for architecture, hyperparameters, and performance
• Introducing a novel regularization scheme for reducing the transferability of adversarial
examples between two or more models
2 RELATED WORK
Adversarial examples in the context of DNNs have come into the spotlight after Szegedy et al.
Szegedy et al. (2013), showed the imperceptibility of the perturbations which could fool state-
of-the-art computer vision systems. Since then, adversarial examples have been demonstrated in
many other domains, notably including speech recognition Carlini and Wagner (2018), and malware
detection Grosse et al. (2016). Nevertheless, CNNs in computer vision provide a convenient domain
to explore adversarial attacks and defenses, both due to the existence of standardized test datasets,
high performing CNN models reaching human or super-human accuracy on clean data, and the
marked deterioration of their performance when subjected to adversarial examples to which human
vision is robust.
The intra-model and inter-model transferability of AdvX was investigated thoroughly by Papernot
et al. (2016). It was found that adversarial examples created for fundamentally different MNIST
classification models could transfer between each other. This showed that neural networks are not
special in their vulnerability, and that simply hiding model details from an attacker is bound to
fail since a substitute model can be trained whose AdvX are likely to transfer to the hidden model.
Further work has revealed the space of transferable AdvX to be large in dimensionality, and sufficient
conditions for transferability were posited as well Tramèr et al. (2017). The results support our
assumption that defending against transfer-attacks is possible even if the original model is vulnerable
to direct attacks.
Transferable AdvX pose a security risk mainly if they are able to cause a misclassification of the same
class between models. Otherwise, a defender could use the disagreement between two models with
similar performance as a way of detecting AdvX. Liu et al. (2017) visualized decision boundaries of
several ImageNet classifiers and found that although targeted adversarial examples transfer to other
models quite easily, they do not transfer with the same target label. However, a targeted attack on an
ensemble of models significantly increases the same-target transfer rate significantly.
It is possible to increase the transferability of AdvX by smoothing the loss function being optimized
by an attack as done by Wu et al. (2018). The authors use cosine similarity between the gradients
of source and target models to justify the claim that increasing the robustness of AdvX to Gaussian
perturbations via smoothing increases their transferability. Hence, we also consider cosine similarity
between gradients as an important quantity, except that we optimize it directly in order to show that
it alone is a significant cause of AdvX transferability. Contrast to Wu et al., we are not optimizing
attacks to increase their strength, but rather regularizing models to be more resistant to transfer attacks.
We stress that this is not the same strategy as obfuscating gradients which was shown to give a false
sense of security by Athalye et al. (2018). Instead, we are constraining models to be fundamentally
diverse in their robustness to different AdvX. An AdvX that fools one model will not fool the other,
and vice versa. This relationship is shown to be attainable empirically via gradient regularization.
2
3 METHODS
3.1 ATTACKS
We consider three attacks in this paper for completeness. For each attack, we work with the output
of the classifier f at the ground truth entry (gt) denoted as fgt instead taking gradients w.r.t. loss
functions since it is notationally more convenient.
FAST GRADIENT SIGN (FGS)
We use the following definition of the FGS attack introduced by Goodfellow et al. (2014)
x′ ← x− sign(∇xfgt(x))
where  is a hyperparameter that controls the `∞ norm of the perturbation.  is typically chosen
in such as way as to fool the model, but such that the adversarial perturbation is not noticeable to
humans, so there is subjectivity involved here as with all attacks. Intuitively, this takes a single step
in the direction that minimizes the prediction confidence for the ground truth class of the classifier on
input x. However, the step is not exactly in the direction of ∇xfgt(x) since the sign function can
cause a difference in angle between ∇xfgt(x) and sign(∇xfgt(x)) of up to pi2 in high dimensions.
This attack relies on the assumption that neural networks are more or less linear, so just a single step
in the gradient direction should be sufficient to cross a decision boundary.
ITERATIVE GRADIENT SIGN (IGS)
The IGS attack (Kurakin et al., 2016) is very similar to the FGS attack, except that it performs many
smaller steps rather than a single step. Two hyperparameters  and T are used where  bounds the `∞
norm between the final adversarial image and the initial image, and T is the number of iterations.
The following procedure is followed
α =

T
x′0 = x
x′t+1 ← x′t − αsign(∇xfgt(x))
CARLINI AND WAGNER (CW)
Carlini and Wagner (2016) introduced a very powerful attack that solves the following optimization
problem using gradient descent:
minimize||δ||p + c · f(x+ δ)
Here c is a hyperaparameter that is optimized using binary search and trades off the two simultaneous
minimization objectives ||δ||p and f(x+ δ). Plainly, it finds a minimal perturbation that will cause a
misclassification.
3.2 WHY TRANSFERABILITY MATTERS
AdvX transferability is a significant security concern since it allows adversaries to fool a machine
learning service in a black-box scenario. Additionally, transfer attacks can be used in grey-box
scenarios where there is a defense in place that obfuscates input-output gradients thereby making it
difficult to directly attack the protected model, but simple to build a surrogate model which can be
easily attacked and whose adversarial examples transfer to the protected model. Thus, we propose a
technique that reduces the transferability between two given models by forcing them to be robust to
different sets of AdvX. Given the ability to reduce the transferability between two models, a trivial
detection method can be constructed as follows:
• Replace the original model M with two models M1 and M2 such that
– M1(x) ≈M2(x) ≈M(x),∀x ∈ Xtrain
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• Compare |M1(x)−M2(x)| to threshold κ to classify images as regular or adversarial
Intuitively, this is an agreement-based detection method that leverages the fact that M1 and M2 are
robust to different AdvX in order to flag inputs where the models differ significantly in prediction
confidence. In the following sections, we discuss in detail how to reduce AdvX transferability between
two models without reducing the performance of those models on the original image classification
task.
3.3 JACOBIAN MAGNITUDE DETERMINES ATTACK DIFFICULTY
Basic perturbation-based attacks such as FGS or IGS exploit ∇xfgt(x) (input-output gradient) by
making changes in input space that are in the opposite direction of ∇xfgt(x). More sophisticated
attacks such as the CW attack can be intuitively thought of as implicitly using this quantity even
though it does not appear in the attack objective itself. We begin by showing a simple result that for a
single classifier f , ||∇xfgt(x)||2 determines the value of  required for the FGS attack to fool the
classifier. While this result is intuitively obvious and easy to demonstrate, it is often overlooked, and
models with a small ||∇xfgt(x)||2 can provide a false sense of security against simple attacks like
FGS.
The claim that ||∇xfgt(x)||2 controls how large of a perturbation must be made to an input in order
to fool a classifier can be demonstrated through a Taylor series approximation.
Let a be the original input and assume that f outputs probabilities. The most effective single step
attack an adversary can perform is to move in the direction opposite of∇afgt(a). Thus, our potential
adversarial example is b = a − ∇afgt(a). The first-order Taylor series approximation of fgt(x)
around a is
fgt(x) ≈ fgt(a) + (x− a) · ∇afgt(a)
fgt(b) ≈ fgt(a) + ((a− ∇afgt(a))− a) · ∇afgt(a)
= fgt(a)− ∇afgt(a) · ∇afgt(a)
= fgt(a)− ||∇afgt(a)||22
Thus, the success of such an attack heavily depends on ||∇afgt(a)||2. FGS and IGS both apply the
signum function to∇afgt(a) as a means of controlling the `∞ norm of the adversarial perturbation,
but the same principle still applies even in this context. Let c = a− sign(∇afgt(a)). Then,
fgt(c) ≈ fgt(a) + ((a− sign(∇afgt(a)))− a) · ∇afgt(a)
= fgt(a)− sign(∇afgt(a)) · ∇afgt(a)
= fgt(a)− ||∇afgt(a)||1
≤ fgt(a)− ||∇afgt(a)||2
Here the last line is due to the triangle inequality. We use this bound instead of regularizing the `1
norm directly since it seems to be more stable in practice. Given this observation, defense researchers
should report ||∇afgt(a)||2 when they publish new results since reporting a low attack success
rate (good defense) can provide a false sense of security against simpler attacks when the gradient
magnitude is low.
3.4 INPUT-OUTPUT JACOBIAN MAGNITUDE AND TRANSFERABILITY ASYMMETRY
For two classifiers f and g assume that f(x) = g(x), ∀x ∈ Xtrain where Xtrain is some training
set. The functions need not be equal when x /∈ Xtrain. If ||∇xfgt(x)||2 = α||∇xggt(x)||2 where
α ∈ R,∀x ∈ Xtrain, then by the result in the previous section
fgt(c) ≈ fgt(a)− ||∇afgt(a)||1
≤ fgt(a)− ||∇afgt(a)||2
= fgt(a)− α||∇aggt(a)||2
Thus, if α 6≈ 1, then fgt(c) 6≈ ggt(c), so we must regularize the models to have ||∇afgt(a)||2 ≈
||∇aggt(a)||2 in order to ensure symmetric transferability results. This may not be a sufficient
condition for transfer attack symmetry, but violating this condition is sure to result in asymmetric
transferability.
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(a) Parallel
(b) Orthogonal
(c) Antiparallel
Figure 1: Illustration of gradient directions for function pairs.
3.5 IMPORTANCE OF GRADIENT ANGLES
To reduce the transferability of AdvX between two different models, we propose to enforce various
geometric relationships between the gradients of the models. Such relationships are visualized in
figure 1. For example, for two models f and g, if these models happen to be trained such that
∀x ∈ Xtrain, fgt(x) = ggt(x) and ∇xfgt(x) · ∇xggt(x) = 0, then the following perturbed input
created for f , c = a− ∇afgt(a), will not have an effect on g as shown by the below Taylor series
approximation
ggt(c) ≈ ggt(a) + ((a− ∇afgt(a))− a) · ∇aggt(a)
= ggt(a)− ∇afgt(a) · ∇aggt(a)
= ggt(a)
This depends on the on the accuracy of the first-order Taylor series approximation around a, which
can be difficult to determine for neural networks. Unfortunately, the gradient relationship ∇xfgt(x) ·
∇xggt(x) = 0 is not sufficient since it implies that the two models have orthogonal gradients which
still means that it is possible to simultaneously attack both models by moving in the average direction
of the gradients of the two models. More specifically, let c = a− (∇afgt(a)+∇aggt(a)2 )
ggt(c) ≈ ggt(a) + ((a− 
2
(∇afgt(a) +∇aggt(a)))− a) · ∇aggt(a)
= ggt(a)− 
2
(∇afgt(a) · ∇aggt(a) +∇aggt(a) · ∇aggt(a))
= ggt(a)− 
2
(||∇aggt(a)||22)
So all the orthogonal direction can do against a clever aversary is double the magnitude of the
perturbation required to fool the classifier for a single-step attack like FGS. This is likely not sufficient
in most cases as the original perturbation is imperceptible to begin with. Thus, we investigate the
antiparallel gradient direction induced by the following relationship∇xfgt(x) · ∇xggt(x) = −1. We
prove that an adversarial input that uses a convex combination of the gradients cannot simultaneously
decrease the prediction confidence of both models.
Let r ∈ [0, 1], c = a− (r∇afgt(a) + (1− r)∇aggt(a))
ggt(c) ≈ ggt(a) + ((a− (r∇afgt(a) + (1− r)∇aggt(a)))− a) · ∇aggt(a)
= ggt(a)−  (r∇afgt(a) · ∇aggt(a) + (1− r)∇aggt(a) · ∇aggt(a))︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ
Case 1: r < 0.5 Assume ||ggt(a)||22 ≈ 1 for convenience which is something that can be attained via
regularization but does not remove the generality of this argument. In fact, this is analogous to local
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Lipschitz-continuity which says that
||g(x)− g(y)||2 < L · ||x− y||2,∀x, y ∈ B (1)
where B is simply the union of epsilon balls Ci = {y ∈ RN : ||xi − y|| < } for  > 0, and xi is
the i-th element of the training set Xtrain (note that B is an open set). There exist techniques for
making neural networks Lipschitz-continuous (Gouk et al., 2018), but we use simple regularization
instead to satisfy the assumption that ||ggt(a)||22 ≈ 1 since the condition is far less restrictive than
local Lipschitz-continuity. Thus,
δ = −r + (1− r)||∇aggt(a)||22
≈ 1− 2r
> 0
This implies that g’s prediction confidence is reduced for the ground truth class. As we can see
though, if this input was given to f , then
δ = r∇afgt(a) · ∇afgt(a) + (1− r)∇aggt(a) · ∇afgt(a)
= r − (1− r)
= −1 + 2r
≤ 0
which implies that the prediction confidence of f will actually be increased instead of decreased. We
omit the other case of this proof as it is symmetric.
Based on the above proof, ∇xfgt(x) · ∇xggt(x) = −1 makes it impossible to craft an input via a
one-step attack such as FGS that will fool both f and g.
3.6 OBTAINING ARBITRARY GRADIENT RELATIONSHIPS
Any gradient relationship between two models mentioned in the previous section can be obtained by
algorithm 1 where parameters are updated in the direction of the negative gradient as to minimize the
loss. It is important to note that the outputs of each model should be a vector softmaxed probabilities
rather than a vector of logits. For example, if the cosine similarity between between∇xfgt(x) and
∇xggt(x) is close to 0, but the models output logits, then the output for some other class could still
be increasing/decreasing. Alternatively, controlling changes in probabilities does ensure that the
probabilities of other classes will not change significantly enough to change the highest probability
class since the probabilities have to sum to 1.
Note that a similar procedure can be used to train a second model once a first model has already been
trained instead of training the two models jointly. We acknowledge that this training procedure could
result in divergence when optimizing via SGD due to the alternating nature of the updates that switch
from optimizing classification loss to gradient loss. Therefore, we also consider a version with a
combined loss Lcombined = Lclass + Lcos which updates the model parameters to simultaneously
improve both classification and gradient loss. The importance of this consideration is shown in
section 5.2.
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Algorithm 1 Proposed Method for Preventing AdvX Transferability
Precondition: Assume M1 and M2 are two randomly initialized neural networks
Precondition: d(·, ·) is cosine similarity.
Precondition: Q(·, ·) samples unique minibatches from a dataset
Let X,Y denote the training images and labels.
Let L(M,x, y) be cross-entropy of model M
Let N be the number of epochs
n = 1
while n < N do
for Q(x,y) ∈ X,Y do
Compute Lclass = L(M1,x,y) + L(M2,x,y)
Compute ∂Lclass∂M1 and update M1 params
Compute ∂Lclass∂M2 and update M2 params
Compute grad1 =
∂M1(x)y
x . M1(x)y is a vector of outputs from M1 at true class
Compute grad2 =
∂M2(x)y
x
Compute Lcos = d(grad1, grad2)
if goal = perpendicular then
Lcos = L
2
cos . Otherwise minimization gives -1 cosine similarity when want 0
else
if goal = parallel then
Lcos = −Lcos . To change gradient update to maximize
end if
end if
Compute ∂LcosM1 and update M1 params
Compute ∂LcosM2 and update M2 params
end for
n = n+ 1
end while
3.7 VERIFYING REGULARIZATION EFFECTIVENESS
Since it is analytically infeasible to verify where enforced gradient relationships will hold for
an arbitrary neural network, we show empirically that the gradient relationships (perpendicular,
antiparallel) enforced between two given models on the training set also hold on the test set.
For tables 1 and 2, 5 pairs of models were trained for all of the relevant gradient similarity scenarios,
including one without gradient regularization. The mean column represents the mean cosine similarity
across the entire dataset averaged across the 5 model pairs, and the std column represents the
standard deviations that were computed for each model pair individually across the entire dataset,
and then averaged across all model pairs. It is clear that the gradient regularization works as
intended, though achieving perfectly anitparallel gradients is non-trivial. Furthermore, there are
some samples for which the cosine similarity between the two models is very far from the goal,
but overall the standard deviation is within an acceptable range. Lastly, the L2-norm difference
|||∇xfgt(x)||2 − ||∇xggt(x)||2| for a given model pair and is an important metric to observe for
transferability since it can explain why transferability between two models might be asymmetric.
This will be further investigated in section 4.2
Table 1: Gradient statistics on the training set of LeNet models trained on MNIST. 5 pairs of models
were trained for each gradient scenario.
Gradient Scenario Mean Cosine Similarity Std Cosine Similarity L2-Norm Difference
No Regularization 0.209 ± 0.017 0.001 ± 0.000 0.001 ± 0.000
Perpendicular 0.002 ± 0.003 0.007 ± 0.003 0.007 ± 0.004
Antiparallel -0.912 ± 0.023 0.006 ± 0.0082 0.006 ± 0.002
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Table 2: Gradient statistics on the test of LeNet models trained on MNIST. 5 pairs of models were
trained for each gradient scenario.
Gradient Scenario Mean Cosine Similarity Std Cosine Similarity L2-Norm Difference
No Regularization 0.209 ± 0.016 0.001 ± 0.000 0.001 ± 0.000
Perpendicular 0.002 ± 0.003 0.007 ± 0.003 0.005 ± 0.004
Antiparallel -0.910 ± 0.024 0.006 ± 0.002 0.006 ± 002
As a sanity check, we verify that there is minimal performance loss when using gradient regularization,
otherwise the regularization defeats the purpose of the defended system. Table 3 shows the decrease
in accuracy for either gradient relation (perpendicular, antiparallel) is within 1% compared to no
regularization, so gradient regularization is a reasonable procedure.
Table 3: Accuracy of LeNet models trained on MNIST. 5 pairs of models were trained for each
gradient scenario.
Training Accuracy Test Accuracy
Gradient Scenario M1 M2 M1 M2
No Regularization 1.000 ± 0.000 1.000 ± 0.000 0.991 ± 0.001 0.992 ± 0.000
Perpendicular 1.000 ± 0.000 1.000 ± 0.000 0.989 ± 0.001 0.990 ± 0.000
Antiparallel 0.998 ± 0.001 0.998 ± 0.002 0.981 ± 0.003 0.980 ± 0.005
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1 SETUP
For section 4.2, 10 models with different random seeds were trained for each gradient magnitude
value. Attacks were performed on a random subset of 1000 test images. For section 4.3, 20 pairs of
models were trained for each setting, and attacks were performed on the entire test set. The use of
many random seeds was done to obtain confidence intervals and ensure that the observed results are
not due to chance.
All experiments were performed on MNIST. While this could be of concern when demonstrating the
effectiveness of a detection method, our principle of gradient regularization has no dependence on
the simplicity or complexity of a dataset, nor do we claim that it is a defense for a single model.
Furthermore, we use the following two-part definition of an adversarial example
1. It is classified as a different class than the image from which it was derived.
2. The image from which it was derived was originally correctly classified.
We say that an adversarial example transfers if it satisfies the above definition, but for a different
model than the one it was created for.
Additionally, we did not use any data augmentation when training our models since that can be
considered as a defense and could further confound results.
All model pairs in sections 4.3 have been regularized such that both models in a pair have a similar
input-output Jacobian L2 Norm. This is done in order to allow a univariate analysis of the effect
of cosine similarity between model gradients. Otherwise, transferability results could be easily
confounded by differences in L2 norms.
Lastly, all attacks performed are untargeted since that is the setting where transferability tends to be
highest.
4.2 ASYMMETRIC ADVX TRANSFERABILITY EXPLAINED
Since there is a clear relationship between ||∇xfgt(x)||2 and attack success rates (section 3.3), we look
at how predictive the difference in magnitudes between the gradients of two models is of transferability
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rates, i.e. if larger |||∇xfgt(x)||2 − ||∇xggt(x)||2| results in more asymmetric transferability. To
ensure univariate analysis, we consider models that had the same random initialization, but were
trained to have different gradient magnitudes. Cosine similarity is not considered as a factor in this
analysis because it is a symmetric metric, and we expect that a low or high cosine similarity would
affect transferability between models in a more or less symmetric way. Table 4 shows how asymmetry
in input-output Jacobian magnitude results in asymmetry of AdvX transferability. It is clear that when
the models have gradients that are similar in magnitude, AdvX transfer much more symmetrically
than when there is a significant difference in magnitude. Transferability decreases quadratically with
the grad magnitude of the 2nd model, and the fitted curve has an R2 = 0.93 indicating a strong
relationship between the two quantities.
Table 4: Asymmetry in AdvX transferability is at least partly explained by differences in input-output
Jacobian magnitude. 10 pairs of LeNet models are considered for each scenario. The models were
trained independently, and each model in a pair received the same random weight initialization. The
attack being considered is IGS with an epsilon of 1.0
Magnitudes M1 M2 M1 to M2 M2 to M1
0.1 & 0.5 0.984 ± 0.003 0.990 ± 0.001 0.824 ± 0.053 0.823 ± 0.040
0.1 & 1.0 0.984 ± 0.003 0.991 ± 0.001 0.834 ± 0.055 0.560 ± 0.047
0.1 & 3.0 0.984 ± 0.003 0.990 ± 0.001 0.783 ± 0.054 0.278 ± 0.034
0.1 & 5.0 0.984 ± 0.003 0.979 ± 0.010 0.757 ± 0.036 0.176 ± 0.034
0.1 & 7.0 0.984 ± 0.003 0.966 ± 0.021 0.768 ± 0.041 0.143 ± 0.025
4.3 REGULARIZED TRANSFERABILITY RESULTS
We consider the effects of the various types of gradient regularization mentioned in section 3.6 using
IGS-1.0 and CW-40. The unconventionally large epsilon value of 1 was selected to obtain large
baseline attack success rates such that there is an obvious order of magnitude difference between
baseline success rates and transfer rates. The high-confidence CW attack was used instead of the
low-confidence version, as per the author’s instructions for finding transferable AdvX. Models without
gradient regularization were trained to establish what transfer rates are on average in a natural setting.
We note that the lowest transferability results for both attacks were achieved by the perpendicular
gradients scenario. In fact, the average transfer rate, relative to no regularization, was cut by ~56%
for the IGS attack (table 5), and by ~47% for the CW attack (table 6) when explicitly training for
perpendicular gradients. The high transferability for the antiparallel direction is unexpected, but we
consider two possible causes of this. First of all, the models trained were not able to achieve truly
antiparallel gradients since the mean cosine similarity was -0.892. Secondly, it is possible that the
loss manifold has many critical points, so even if gradients were truly antiparallel locally on training
data, moving in the direction that increases confidence for a given model could eventually end up
overshooting a peak and ending up in a valley of low confidence.
Table 5: Transferability results on LeNet model pairs for MNIST attacked with IGS-1.0.
Gradient Scenario M1 M2 M1 to M2 M2 to M1
No Regularization 0.970 ± 0.038 0.981 ± 0.009 0.268 ± 0.108 0.311 ± 0.125
Parallel All 0.863 ± 0.143 0.883 ± 0.101 0.720 ± 0.180 0.741 ± 0.167
Perpendicular All 0.951 ± 0.077 0.946 ± 0.058 0.117 ± 0.064 0.133 ± 0.046
Antiparallel All 0.869 ± 0.062 0.859 ± 0.069 0.435 ± 0.110 0.487 ± 0.164
5 DISCUSSION
Reducing AdvX transferability by using easy-to-implement regularization that is independent of
model architecture provides new ways for making model ensembles more robust to AdvX. Attacking
an ensemble when the individual models have orthogonal input-output Jacobians is a difficult task
since making progress on reducing the confidence of a single model is likely to have little effect
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Table 6: Transferability results on LeNet model pairs for MNIST attacked with CW-40
Gradient Scenario M1 M2 M1 to M2 M2 to M1
No Regularization 0.991 ± 0.001 0.991 ± 0.001 0.044 ± 0.028 0.048 ± 0.029
Parallel All 0.965 ± 0.020 0.970 ± 0.014 0.696 ± 0.119 0.687 ± 0.151
Perpendicular All 0.987 ± 0.002 0.987 ± 0.002 0.023 ± 0.011 0.022 ± 0.009
Antiparallel All 0.957 ± 0.030 0.955 ± 0.031 0.456 ± 0.154 0.493 ± 0.202
on the confidence of another model for the true class. A simple agreement-based detection method
for AdvX can be created with just a two-model ensemble which provides an efficient defense that
makes no assumptions about data distributions or model architectures. Although the transferability
results presented in section 4.3 show a clear improvement in robustness to transfer attacks compared
to when no regularization is used, even better results are likely possible. For example, we consider
regularizing curvature to further reduce transferability as future work. Note that each model pair had
identical architecture and hyperparameters, so it is encouraging that we were able to cut baseline
transferability rates by half given this restriction. If different model architectures were used in a pair,
in addition to gradient regularization, we believe that AdvX transfer attack rates would be even lower.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
5.1 MODEL DETAILS
INDIVIDUAL MODELS
Each individual LeNet model trained with regularization that controls input-output Jacobian magni-
tude had the following architecture:
LeNet(
(conv1): Conv2d(1, 6, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1))
(relu): ReLU()
(max1): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1,
ceil_mode=False)
(conv2): Conv2d(6, 16, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1))
(relu): ReLU()
(max2): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=2, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1,
ceil_mode=False)
(fc1): Linear(in_features=400, out_features=120, bias=True)
(relu): ReLU()
(fc2): Linear(in_features=120, out_features=84, bias=True)
(relu): ReLU()
(fc3): Linear(in_features=84, out_features=10, bias=True)
)
and hyperparameters:
• Epochs: 500
• Learning Rate: 0.001
• Optimizer: Adam with β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.999
• Batch Size: 100
Note that there was no shuffling of training data between epochs. There was also no data augmentation,
batch normalization, early stopping, etc. This was all done to ensure a univariate analysis when
running experiments.
The random seeds used were [100, 109].
MODEL PAIRS
When training LeNet model pairs, the same architecture was used as when training individual models,
though the number of epochs was less. The hyperparameters were
• Epochs: 200
• Learning Rate: 0.001
• Optimizer: Adam with β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.999
• Batch Size: 100
Note that since the model weights were randomly initialized sequentially, the two models differed in
initialization.
The random seeds used were [150, 169].
5.2 IMPORTANCE OF GRADIENT UPDATES
To determine the benefit of using simultaneous updates compared to alternating updates, we consider
both model performance and gradient cosine similarity at the same time. We do this for the more
complex dataset FashionMNIST which allows for a more obvious distinction between the two update
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techniques. Table 7 shows the distinction between the update approaches. The simultaneous update
is more effective since it results in higher accuracy and cosine similarity that is closer to the goal.
However, we use the alternating update in our experiments since the benefit is not significant, and
because the simultaneous update presents a hyperparameter that needs to trade off classification loss
and cosine similarity loss.
Table 7: Comparison of alternating and simultaneous updates for 5 pairs of LeNet models trained on
FashionMNIST. -A indicates alternating, and -S indicates simlutaneous. The improvement in cosine
similarity and performance is clear, even though it is small.
Accuracy Cosine Similarity
Gradient Scenario M1 M2 Mean Std
Perpendicular -A 0.996 ± 0.002 0.994 ± 0.002 0.008 ± 0.002 0.016 ± 0.001
Perpendicular -S 0.997 ± 0.001 0.997 ± 0.001 0.004 ± 0.001 0.013 ± 0.002
Antiparallel -A 0.965 ± 0.009 0.973 ± 0.007 -0.908 ± 0.034 0.038 ± 0.012
Antiparallel -S 0.982 ± 0.013 0.979 ± 0.011 -0.931 ± 0.040 0.043 ± 0.015
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